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ABSTRACT 
 
Full Name : Faisal Saleh 
Thesis Title : Systematic Evaluation and Improvement of Security Requirement 
Engineering Notations 
Major Field : Computer Science 
Date of Degree : May 2014 
 
 [Context and Motivation] Security has become one of the most important aspects of 
software design. Software in today’s world needs to detect and stop threats posed from 
authorized and unauthorized users. Misuse case (MUC) and misuse case maps (MUCM) 
modeling notations allow security analysts to consider and account for security 
requirements in the early stages of a development process instead of relying on generic 
defensive mechanisms that are augmented to software systems post-development. 
[Problem/Question] Most research contribution in the area of MUC and MUCM focus 
on extending the notation to increase its coverage of additional security related semantics. 
However, there lacks research that evaluates the perception of MUC and MUCM models 
by its readers. A misread or misinterpreted model can have dire consequences 
downstream leading to the development of an insecure system. [Principal Ideas] This 
work presents a scientific evaluation of the cognitive effectiveness of MUC and MUCM 
modeling notation based on theory principles and empirical evidence from the cognitive 
science field. Such evaluations can be the basis on which the notations can be improved 
further. [Contribution] The evaluation of MUC and MUCM highlights several instances 
where the cognitive effectiveness notations in question can be improved. We have 
modified the MUC modeling notation based on the evaluation to improve its cognitive 
xiii 
 
effectiveness. Furthermore, we have conducted an extensive empirical evaluation of the 
improvements that has given positive results. 
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  ﺍﻟﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔﻣﻠﺧﺹ 
 
 
 ﻓﻳﺻﻝ ﺻﺎﻟﺢ : ﺍﻻﺳﻡ ﺍﻟﻛﺎﻣﻝ
 
 ﺗﻘﻳﻳﻡ ﻭ ﺗﺣﺳﻳﻥ ﻣﻧﻬﺟ ﻳ ﻟﺭﻣﻭﺯ ﻫﻧﺩﺳﻪ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻁﻠﺑﺎﺕ ﺍﻵﻣﻧﺔ ﻋﻧﻭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ:
 
 ﻋﻠﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺳﺏ ﺍﻟﺗﺧ ﺻﺻ:
 
    4102 -ﻣﺎﻳﻭ :ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻣﻳﺔ
 
ﺍﺻﺑﺢ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺃﺣﺩ ﺍﻫﻡ ﺍﻟﺟﻭﺍﻧﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺻﻣﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻣﺟﻳﺎﺕ. ﻓﻱ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺎﺻﺭ، ﺗﺣﺗﺎﺝ   )ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻭﻯ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻓﺯ(
ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻣﺟﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺭﻑ ﻭ ﺇﻳﻘﺎﻑ ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺎﻁﺭ ﺍﻟﻧﺍﺟﻣﻪ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﺭﺡ ﻭ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﺭﺡ ﺑﻬﻡ. ﺭﻣﻭﺯ ﻧﻣﺫﺟﻪ 
ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﻧﻅﻣﻪ ﺧﻼﻝ  ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ  ﻭ ﺧﺭﺍﺋﻁ ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺗﺳﻣﺢ ﻟﻣﺣﻠﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﺣﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﺑﻧﻣﺫﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻁﻠﺑﺎﺕ
ﻣﺭﺍﺣﻝ ﺑﺎﻛﺭﻩ ﻣﻥ ﻋﻣﻠﻳﻪ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﻋﻭﺿﺎ ًﻋﻥ ﺍﻹﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘﻧﻳﺎﺕ ﺣﻣﺎﻳﻪ ﻋﺎﻣﻪ ﺗﺿﺎﻑ ﻟﻸﻧﻅﻣﻪ ﺑﻌﺩ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﻬﺎء ﻣﻥ 
ﺍﻟﻌﺩﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﻭﺙ ﺃﺿﺎﻓﺕ ﺎﻟﻰ ﻣﺟﺎﻻﺕ ﻧﻣﺫﺟﻪ ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻰ )ﺍﻟﻣﺷﻛﻠﻪ/ ﺍﻟﺳﺅﺍﻟ ( ﻋﻣﻠﻳﻪ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ. 
ﺯﺎﺩﺕ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﻳﻪ ﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﺣﺗﻭﺍء ﺍﻛﺑﺭ ﻗﺩﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻡﻔﺎﻫﻳﻡ  ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﺩﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺧﺭﺍﺋﻁ ﺳﻭء
ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﻪ. ﻋﻣﻭﻣﺎ،ً ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﻧﻘﺹ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺑﺣﺎﺙ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻘﻳﻡ ﺍﻹﺳﺗﻘﺑﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺑﺻﺭﻱ ﻟﻘﺎﺭﺉ ﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻭ ﺧﺭﺍﺋﻁ 
ﺗﺑﺎﻋﺎ ﺗﻘﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ. ﺍﻟﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻳﺳﺎء ﻓﻬﻣﻬﺎ ﺍﻭ ﺗﻔﺳﻳﺭﻫﺎ  ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺍﻥ ﺗﺅﺩﻱ ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﻛﺎﺭﺛﻳﻪ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ 
ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺙ ﻳﻘﺩﻡ ﺗﻘﻳﻳﻡ ﻣﻧﻬﺟﻲ ﻟﻔﻌﺎﻟﻳﻪ ﺇﺩﺭﺍﻙ ﺭﻣﻭﺯ ﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ )ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭﻩ ﺎﻷﺳﺎﺳﻳﻪ( ﺃﻧﻅﻣﻪ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺁﻣﻧﻪ. 
ﻭ ﺧﺭﺍﺋﻁ ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺑﺍﻹﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻅﺭﻳﺎﺕ ﻭ ﺩﻻﺋﻝ ﻣﺛﺑﺗﻪ ﻣﻥ ﻋﻠﻡ ﺍ.ﻹﺑﺍ .ﻙﺍﺭﻹﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺛﻝ ﻫﺫﺍ 
ﺗﻘﻳﻳﻡ ﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻭ ﺧﺭﺍﺋﻁ  )ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺎﻫﻣﻪ( ﺻﻭﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ.ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻳﻳﻡ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺗﺣﺳﻳﻥ ﻣﻛﺎﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻘ
ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺃﻭﺿﺢ ﻋﺩﻩ ﺃﻣﺛﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻛﻣﻥ ﻗﺻﻭﺭ ﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺭﻣﻭﺯ ﻣﻥ ﻥﺎﺣﻳﻪ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻳﻪ ﺍﻹﺩﺭﺍﻙ. ﻗﻣﻧﺎ ﺑﺗﻌﺩﻳﻝ ﺭﻣﻭﺯ 
ﺍﻳﺿﺎ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺙ ﻗﺎﻡ ﺎﻋﻠﻳﻪ. ﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺑﺍﻹﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘﻳﻳﻡ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻳﻪ ﺍﻹﺩﺭﺍﻙ ﺛﻡ ﺗﺑﺎﻋﺎ ﺗﺣﺳﻳﻥ ﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﻔ
ﺳﻪ ﺗﻅﻬﺭ ﺍﻥ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺭﺍﺣﺎﺕ ﻗﺎﻣﺕ ﺑﺗﺣﺳﻳ ﻧ ﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﺳﻭء ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻣﻥ ﻥﺎﺣﻳﻪ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺟﺎﺑﻪ ﺍﻟﺯﻣﻧﻳﻪ ﻭ ﻣﻥ ﻥﺎﺣﻳﻪ ﺍﺑﻌﻣﻝ ﺩﺭ
  ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺙ.ﺎﻷﺧﻁﺎء ﺍﻟﻣﺭﺗﻛﺑﻪ ﻣﻥ 
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1. CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Progress in software development methodologies has paved the way to develop more 
complex systems. Security in such systems has become a key design quality attribute 
where a secure system should also have the ability to detect potential threats and act 
accordingly. Security threats can originate from outside users trying to harm a system and 
from insiders with authorized access. A secure system should have a mechanism to keep 
malicious users out and have access control measures for inside users. 
Traditional requirement engineering modeling techniques lack support to specify security 
related issues. To this end, a number of modeling techniques have been devised to 
account for important security aspects. In this study, we will focus on two security based 
modeling techniques, Misuse Case (MUC) [1] and Misuse Case Maps (MUCM) [2]. 
Misuse case modeling notation is an extension of the popular Use Case modeling 
technique (UC) [3] and as a results, is used to model the functional security requirements 
of a system. Likewise, Misuse case maps is an extension of the popular Use Case Maps 
modeling technique (UCM) [4] that models a systems architecture and its behavior. 
Misuse case maps addressed security requirements with respect to the architecture of the 
system. It models the threats that are present on the system architecture. 
Visual notations provide crucial means of conveying information between different 
stakeholders of different backgrounds. To accurately communicate information, notations 
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need to be easily comprehensible by the human mind (cognitively effective) [5]. The 
afore mentioned notations are no exception, yet decisions regarding the design of 
graphical symbols for software engineering notations are made subjectively, without 
providing any insight on the selection process [6], [7], [8]. These design choices can 
affect the cognitive expressiveness of a notation and its ability to convey information in 
an informative manner. Research in the field of visual notations design in software 
engineering has discriminately focused on the semantic constructs that they are desired to 
support. It is important for a modeling language to support important semantics; however, 
it is arguably equally as important to support its readability and comprehension by its 
potential readers. Whilst a misread or misinterpreted functional requirement may lead to 
the development of a system that does not satisfy its functional requirements, a misread 
or misinterpreted security diagram may lead to the development of an insecure system, 
effectively rendering it useless. 
Recent developments have allowed researchers to evaluate and design visually effective 
notations. In particular, the “Physics of Notations” (PoN) [6] defines principles that can 
be used to evaluate the cognitive effectiveness of the visual syntax of notations. These 
principles are based on theory and evidence from multiple fields. The focus of these 
principles is on the visual aspects of a notation rather than semantic aspects. The first 
goal of this study is to evaluate the MUC and MUCM modeling techniques and propose 
changes to MUC modeling that adhere to afore mentioned principles. The second goal is 
to evaluate whether the changes conforming to the principles for MUC modeling will 
result in an extension of the notation that is better equipped to support readability and 
comprehension by its readers. 
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1.1. Problem Statement 
Focus on visual notations used during requirement engineering for readability and 
comprehension has been lacking until recently. PoN provides a way to systematically 
evaluate and improve visual notations. This study focuses on the following two 
questions:  
 What are the shortcomings in MUC and MUCM modeling techniques according 
to PoN? 
 Does resolving the shortcomings highlighted by PoN actually improve MUC? 
 
1.2. Objectives 
The main objective in this study is to evaluate and improve the effectiveness with which 
the MUC and MUCM modeling techniques convey information to users. The main 
objectives of this work are as follows: 
1. Evaluate the MUC modeling notation using the principles defined in PoN and 
formulate suggestions that satisfy the principles wherever possible. 
2. Evaluate the MUCM modeling notation using the principles defined in PoN. 
3. Conduct an empirical evaluation on the proposed notation for MUC containing 
the changes suggested in step 1. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine 
whether the effects of the changes proposed are positive or negative when 
compared with the original notation. 
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1.3. Research Methodology  
The research methodology in this works is as follows:  
1. Literature Review – In this step, the principles defined in PoN were studied 
meticulously, followed by review of literature to find if the evaluation of MUC 
and MUCM using PoN has been undertaken already. 
2. Evaluation of notations – Next, we conducting an evaluation of the MUC and 
MUCM modeling techniques using PoN, thus answering the first of the research 
question. 
3. Formulate Suggestions – Based on the shortcomings highlighted in Step 2, we 
formulate suggestions for MUC modeling notation that adhere to and overcome 
the challenges found during evaluation. 
4. Evaluation of proposed notation – Conduct a controlled experiment in which the 
aim is to evaluate the performance of proposed notation based on factors such as 
time and errors.  
5. Result compilation – The results of the studies are compiled and studied to 
conclude whether the following the principles defined in PoN actually improves 
the MUC modeling notation, thus answer the second research question. 
 
1.4. Contributions  
The contributions of this study are evaluation of MUC and MUCM security modeling 
techniques according to the principles defined in PoN. This study also contains a 
proposed extension to the MUC modeling notation that has yielded better performance 
than the original notation during empirical evaluation. 
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1.5. Outline 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review of 
notations evaluated using PoN, followed by a brief introduction to PoN, MUC and 
MUCM. Chapter 3 contains the evaluation of MUC and MUCM using the PoN, 
highlighting problems in the notation that affect the cognition. In chapter 4, we first 
provide suggestions to improve the MUC notation and then present the results of 
empirical evaluation for the NN. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and presents 
some directions in which future work can be done. We have also added all the 
information used to conduct the empirical evaluation and all the results of the evaluation 
at the end as appendix. 
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2. CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
The "Physics of Notations" [6] defines principles that are based on theory and empirical 
evidence from multiple fields. These principles focus on the visual aspects of a notation 
with the goal of analyzing, comparing and improving visual notations by improving their 
cognitive effectiveness. Several evaluations of existing notations have been undertaken 
with the principles as the theoretical basis. 
An evaluation of UML diagrams family was presented in [9]. The study focused on the 
common elements present across the entire family of UML diagrams. The authors argue 
that visual development of UML diagrams is lagging because of lack of attention to 
visual aspects. According to [9], class diagrams have the worst visual representation. The 
authors of the work suggested general improvements, instead of specific diagram based 
improvements, that are applicable to all of the diagrams in UML. In [5], the authors 
evaluated the goal-oriented modeling notation i*. Several shortcomings in the existing 
notation were found during evaluation. The authors suggested several improvements that 
included the use of color, more perceptually directed symbols and redundant coding. An 
evaluation of BPMN (Business Process Modeling Notation) [10] was presented in [11]. 
BPMN aims to provide a notation understood by all stakeholders. The evaluation found 
several shortcomings according to the principles that hinder its comprehension by some 
of its stakeholders. The authors provided suggestions to improve the cognitive 
effectiveness of the notation. The visual notation of use case maps (UCM) [4] was 
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analyzed in [12]. The evaluation found several common weaknesses and suggested 
improvements. One of the problems with the notation was the large number of graphical 
symbols used that create a significant load on the cognition of the user. 
In addition to the evaluation of existing notations, the principles of cognitively effective 
visual notations have been used to design new notations that are readily comprehensible. 
The Visual Traceability Modeling Language (VTML) [13] was designed according to the 
principles in PoN. The aim of VTML is to define traceability strategies for a project and 
then visually represent trace queries as constraints upon subsets of the model. 
The following section presents a brief introduction to the PoN evaluation framework that 
will be used as the basis for the evaluation of MUC and MUCM. The notation of MUC 
and MUCM are introduced afterwards. 
 
2.1. Physics of Notation 
The cognitive effectiveness of visual syntax in requirements engineering notations has 
been overlooked until recently. The seminal paper that brought the concept of evidence-
based visual syntax evaluation of software engineering notation was only been published 
in 2009 [6]. The paper explained the “Physics of Notation” and the outcome is nine 
evidence-based principles upon which the cognitive effectiveness of a notation can be 
evaluated. The principles are based on theory and empirical evidence from various 
science fields, in particular the cognitive science field. The principles can, and should be, 
used as basis for improving current notation and when formulating new notations.  
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In order to introduce any framework with the ability to create and improve a notation, we 
must first understand how visual notations communicate, which requires help from other 
fields such as communication, semiotics, graphic design, visual perception and cognition. 
The underlying communication theory [14] involves the sender encoding a message that 
a receiver decodes. In the context of visual notations, the diagram designer (sender) 
creates (encode) the diagram (message) that other stakeholders (receiver) interpret 
(decode). The underlying message is lost if any uncertainty is present while encoding and 
decoding.  
 
Figure 1 Bertin’s Visual Variables for Graphical Notations 
 
For words and sentences to be created in any language, certain primitive alphabets have 
to be defined. These alphabets are then combined in various forms to create words. To 
encode information graphically, Bertin [15] defined 8 visual variables (Figure 1): 
horizontal position, vertical position, shape, color, brightness, size, texture, and 
orientation. These variables are the visual alphabets for graphical notations, which can be 
combined in any combination to create unlimited amount of graphical symbols. Visual 
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notation designers must use these variables to create the visual notation set that is most 
appropriate to their task. The visual notation set is an important aspect that must be 
considered for optimizing communication (encode and decode). 
 
Figure 2 Principles of Cognitive Effective Visual Notation 
 
Based on theories from other fields, the principles (Figure 2) in PoN focus on the 
perceptual attributes of a visual notation rather than the semantics of its graphical 
symbols. A brief summary of each principle is presented next. 
2.1.1. Semiotic Clarity  
The principles for designing of cognitively effective visual notations are presented as a 
modular structure at the center of which lies the principle of Semiotic Clarity. The 
principle of semiotic clarity states that notations should be designed in such a way that 
the graphical symbols have a one-to-one mapping to the semantic constructs they 
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represent. Failure to achieve this desired mapping can lead to one or more of the 
following four anomalies (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Principle of Semiotic Clarity 
 
─ Symbol Redundancy - Occurs when multiple graphical symbols are available to 
represent of one semantic construct. This can lead to confusion when using the 
notation, as although the author has a choice, there is no clear method to choose one 
over the other. 
─ Symbol Overload - Occurs when one graphical symbol represents multiple semantic 
constructs. Perhaps the most serious anomaly as a reader of the notation cannot 
definitively decide which construct a given symbol represents.  
─ Symbol Deficit - Occurs when a semantic construct is not represented by any graphical 
symbol. 
─ Symbol Excess - Occurs when a graphical symbol does not have a referent semantic 
construct. 
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Evaluating a notation for the principle of semiotic clarity requires finding the presence of 
the aforementioned anomalies by comparing the symbol set of the notation to its semantic 
constructs. 
2.1.2. Visual Expressiveness  
Recall that notation designers must use Bertin’s [15] visual variable to design visual 
notation set. The greater the number of visual variables used and the ranges used within 
each variable, the more visually expressive a notation becomes. The use of text is 
encouraged as a means for redundant coding that complements graphical symbols, 
instead of means to differentiate constructs. Using few visual variables can also have 
adverse effects on the perceptual discriminability of symbols within one notational set as 
discussed next. 
2.1.3. Perceptual Discriminability  
Perceptual Discriminability is concerned with the ease with which graphical symbols 
belonging to a notation can be differentiated from each other. It requires visual language 
designers to maximize their utilization of different visual variables to increase the visual 
distance [6] between symbols in order to visually stand out for easier recognition.  
2.1.4. Dual Coding  
Using Text as the primary means to distinguish between two constructs is ill advised [6], 
according to the principle of Dual Coding. However, using text per se should not be 
forbidden. In fact, according to dual coding theory [16], using graphics and text together 
to convey information is more effective than using either on their own. Therefore, text 
should be used as a form of redundant coding to complement graphics. According to 
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communication theory, redundant coding reduces errors and counteracts noise [17]. The 
extra information in verbal form provides better clarification of the meaning of 
constructs.  
2.1.5. Graphic Economy  
The principle of Graphic Economy refers to having a suitable number of graphical 
symbols available for use in any notation. A large number of graphical symbols can lead 
to complex diagrams and a steep learning curve for novices. Research has introduced an 
upper limit of 6 categories for humans to discriminate between perceptually distinct 
alternatives [18].  
2.1.6. Semantic Transparency  
The principle of Semantic Transparency is concerned with the use of graphical symbols 
that imply the meaning of their corresponding constructs. For example, a lock symbol 
suggests protection of some kind while a symbol of a key suggests the ability to open 
some kind of protection. The use of such symbols speeds up the interpretation of 
diagrams and reduces the time needed for novices to learn the notation.  
2.1.7. Complexity Management  
The principle of Complexity Management recommends that a notation should include 
mechanisms to manage complex diagrams. The mechanisms enable models to convey 
information without overloading the human mind. Modularization and hierarchical 
abstractions are two techniques that can be used to manage complexity [6]. 
Modularization is concerned with the division of a large complex system into smaller 
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parts that are easier to comprehend. Hierarchical abstraction focuses on representing a 
large complex system with different levels, where levels have different degrees of detail.  
2.1.8. Cognitive Integration  
The principle of Cognitive integration refers to the inclusion of mechanisms to support 
integration of information with other diagrams. Conceptual integration and perceptual 
integration are two categories of cognitive integration. Conceptual integration is 
concerned with providing mechanisms to help assemble information from multiple 
diagrams to form a more complete model mentally. Perceptual integration involves 
providing cues for easier navigation between multiple diagrams.  
2.1.9. Cognitive Fit  
The cognitive fit principle is concerned with having various suitable dialects for each 
targeted audience. Some dialects can be made complex and suitable for advanced users 
while other dialects can be simplified and made suitable for novices. Any requirements 
engineering artifact should be readable and comprehensible by non-technical 
stakeholders who can provide critical early phase feedback. 
 
2.2. Misuse Cases 
Sindre and Opdahl [19][20][21] first described misuse cases as negative use cases, 
highlighted by their unwanted interaction with a system. MUC modeling extended UC 
modeling by introducing four new concepts that are critical to specifying functional 
security requirements. The new concepts are misuse cases, misusers, threaten 
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relationship and mitigate relationship. Their ensuing work [1] formally defined the 
concepts of a misuse case and misuser as follows: 
─ Misuse Case – “a sequence of actions, including variants, that a system or other entity 
can perform, interacting with misusers of the entity and causing harm to some 
stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to complete” [1] 
─ Misuser – “an actor that initiates misuse cases, either intentionally or inadvertently” [1] 
The semantics of a misuse case and a misuser are similar, but inverse, to that of a use 
case and an actor, respectively. Hence, the graphical symbols for MUC were created by 
inverting the color scheme in UC notation while keeping the same symbols (see Figure 
4). The Threatens relationship is used to indicate that a misuse case is threatening the 
integrity of a system while a particular use case is being executed. The Mitigates 
relationship is used to indicate that a use case is executed as a countermeasure to offset 
the attempted harm caused by a misuse case. Therefore, the Threatens relationship is 
depicted as an arrow that is directed from a misuse case to a corresponding use case. 
While the Mitigates relationship is depicted as an arrow that is directed from a use case to 
a corresponding misuse case. 
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Figure 4 Misuse Case Notation Legend 
 
Røstad [22] later expanded misuse cases to include the category of insiders that have 
different potential of attacking the system than misusers. An insider is a misuser who 
belongs to the group of authorized users for the system that is under attacked and hence 
has easier access to the system. Another addition by [22] to misuse cases was the addition 
of the Vulnerability and the Exploits relationship concepts. A Vulnerability is a weakness 
in the system that can be exploited by misusers (and insider) to attack the system. The 
Exploits relationship is used to denote which vulnerability a misuse case targets to harm 
the system with the use of a directed arrow from a misuse case to a vulnerable use case. 
Figure 4 contains the entire notational set of MUC that corresponds to the entire set of the 
aforementioned semantics. 
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2.3. Misuse Case Maps 
Karpati, Sindre and Opdahl [2] saw a need for a requirement modeling technique that 
addressed security requirements with respect to a secure architecture. They extended the 
UCM [4] modeling technique with several constructs to help model security related 
scenarios to create the MUCM modeling notation. Key components of the extension 
include the addition of exploit paths, vulnerability and mitigation. Exploit paths are steps 
in a scenario that can compromise a system. Each exploit path can be numbered to show 
the steps in which a complex scenario can be achieved. Vulnerability is a weak point in 
the system where the exploit path intersects a component of the system. Misusers can 
exploit vulnerabilities to adversely affect the system, causing harm and disruption. Lastly, 
the system’s ability to detect threats and counter can be modeled using mitigation. 
 
Figure 5 Misuse Case Maps Modeling Legend 
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In addition to previously discussed components, several other components are also added. 
Figure 5 presents the full notation set of MUCM containing the security-based additions 
to UCM. 
The authors of the paper provide a rationale on the choice of graphical symbol for the 
new components, albeit briefly. The authors explored using inverted symbols in the 
MUCM extension as was done to for the creation of MUC modeling extension. However, 
the original UCM notation’s use of filled symbols for start and end points along with 
solid lines for paths required the authors to use other means (color and shapes) to 
distinguish between positive and negative scenarios. 
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3. CHAPTER 3 
NOTATION EVALUATION 
3.1. Misuse Case Modeling 
This section contains the evaluation results of the MUC notation according to nine 
principles defined in PoN [6]. The evaluation considers the original notational set 
introduced by Sindre and Opdahl [1] in addition to the expanded notational set introduced 
by Røstad [22]. The expanded notational set by [22] is considered in our evaluation as it 
is, according to the literature, the most advanced use case-based functional security-based 
modeling notation. The evaluation is presented in the following nine subsections, each 
summarizing a principle and presenting the evaluation results of the MUC modeling 
notation based on that principle. An outline of the subsequent subsections is presented in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 MUC Evaluation Outline 
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3.1.1. Semiotic Clarity 
The principle of semiotic clarity states that notations should be designed in such a way 
that the graphical symbols have a one-to-one mapping to the semantic constructs they 
represent. Failure to achieve such mapping can lead to one of more of the following 
anomaly: Symbol Redundancy, Symbol Overload, Symbol Deficit, and Symbol Excess. 
Evaluating a notation for the principle of semiotic clarity requires finding the presence of 
the aforementioned anomalies by comparing the symbol set of the notation to its 
semantics. For MUC modeling notation, the semantics embodied by the technique 
derived from the representative literature, in particular the works of [1][22]. 
Symbol Redundancy - The MUC modeling notation does not contain any instances of 
symbol redundancy. All the constructs available in the meta-model have at most one 
corresponding graphical symbol to represent them. 
Symbol Overload - The MUC modeling notation has two cases of symbol overload. 
Table 1 shows the symbols and their corresponding constructs that are involved in 
symbol overload cases. In UC modeling, the conventional oval symbol is used to 
represent a use case. However, in MUC modeling, these become specialized types of use 
cases: vulnerable, threatened and mitigating use cases. Vulnerable use cases have a 
unique grey background and thus are not involved in any symbol overload cases. 
However, threatened and mitigating use cases are important security based concepts that 
should be visually differentiated and not just semantically. One type is supposed to show 
potential weakness while the other should show abatement of a threatening misuse case. 
Threatened and mitigating use cases should also be differentiated visually from regular 
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use cases. According to the current notation, regular, threatened or mitigating use cases 
use the same symbol.  
Table 1 Overloaded symbols and their semantic constructs 
Symbol Semantic Constructs 
 
 Mitigating use case 
 Threatened use case 
 Regular use case 
 
 Includes relationship 
 Extends relationship 
 Exploits relationship 
 Mitigates relationship 
 Threatens relationship 
 
The second case of symbol overload occurs with the arrow symbol which represents 
includes, extends, exploits, threatens and mitigates relationships. The dash arrows symbol 
is used to represent all of these relations. In the current notation, the only way to set apart 
relations is by reading the annotated textual stereotypes. The principle of dual coding 
(presented later in Section 3.1.4) advises against using text as the only means to 
distinguish between different symbols. 
Symbol deficit and Symbol Excess - The MUC modeling notation has no symbol deficit 
since all the semantic constructs can be represented by one graphical symbol. Note that 
symbol deficit is evaluated based on the semantics described by the respective authors of 
the notations [1][22]. However, to fully prove the absence of any instances of symbol 
deficit, an in depth ontological analysis of the security domain will be required in order to 
identify any missing semantic concepts not covered in [20][22], which is beyond the 
scope of this work. Similarly, the MUC modeling notation does not contain any instances 
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of symbol excess as each graphical symbol corresponds to at least one semantic 
construct.  
3.1.2. Visual Expressiveness 
The principle of Visual Expressiveness suggests that notation designers use as many of 
Bertin’s [15] visual variables to increase the expressiveness of notation as a whole, while 
limiting the use of text. The notation of MUC modeling only uses a combination of two 
visual variables: shape and brightness. For the shape visual variable, three different 
values are used: ovals, stickman figures and arrows. Brightness levels vary in each of the 
different shapes. Ovals and stickman figures have three brightness levels: white, grey, 
and black. Arrows only have two brightness values: solid and dashed. To compensate for 
the underutilization of visual variables, the MUC modeling notation makes extensive use 
of textual encoding. The use of text is discouraged except in the case of redundant coding 
that complements graphical symbols. Using such few visual variables can also have 
adverse effects on the perceptual discriminability of symbols within one notational set as 
discussed in the following section. 
3.1.3. Perceptual Discriminability 
Perceptual Discriminability is concerned with the ease with which graphical symbols 
belong to the same notation can be differentiated from each other. It requires visual 
language designers to maximize their utilization of different visual variables levels to 
increase the visual distance [6] between symbols in order to visually stand out for easier 
recognition. Recall that the MUC modeling notation only uses two visual variables: 
shape and brightness. Given that shape is the primary basis upon which humans identify 
objects in the real world [6][23][24][25] assessment of the MUC modeling notation with 
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respect to the perceptual discriminability principle is performed by comparing symbols 
that belong to same shape category. Three shape categories are identified: ovals, stickman 
figures and arrows. 
Ovals - This shape category includes regular, vulnerable, threatened and mitigating use 
cases, in addition to misuse cases. Recall that regular, threatened and mitigating use cases 
utilize the same exact symbol; therefore there is no perceptual discriminability between 
them. Brightness is the only means to distinguish between use cases, misuse cases and 
vulnerable use cases. Three levels of brightness are used: white for use cases, black for 
misuse cases, and grey for vulnerable use cases. The three levels of brightness used are 
appropriate for the semantics they represent. White and black are at the extreme ends of 
the brightness visual variable. This is appropriate as they are the complete opposites of 
one another with respect to security threat levels. Vulnerable use cases are not quite 
harmful as misuse cases yet they may eventually lead to damage being caused and 
therefore they are not quite peaceful as use cases. As such, the use of the color grey is 
also appropriate for vulnerable use cases since it is the midway value in the brightness 
range.  
Stickman Figures - This shape category includes actors, misusers and inside attackers. 
Once again, brightness is the only means to distinguish between actors, misusers and 
inside attackers. Unlike the oval shape, brightness in stickman figures is only visible from 
the head part of a stickman figure. Therefore, perceptual discriminability between 
symbols within the stickman figure shape family is lesser than that of symbols within the 
oval shape family. If the size of the stickman figure is too small, especially the head, then 
brightness alone might be insufficient for the different concepts to be differentiated from 
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one another, which may lead to misinterpretations. Once again the three levels of 
brightness are appropriately used with black and white denoting extreme ends of security 
threat levels. Inside attackers are not pure misusers as they are authorized users of a 
system, yet they intend harm and thus are not purely peaceful as actors. As such, the use 
of the color grey is appropriate for inside attackers.  
Table 2 Relations with corresponding visual variable used to represent them. 
Relationship Symbol 
Generalization 
 
Association  
Include, Extend, Exploit, 
Threatens and Mitigates  
Directed Association 
 
 
Arrows - MUC modeling introduced three new relationships along with ones already 
present in UC modeling. The complete set of relationships is shown in Table 2. Symbols 
that appear in the same row cannot be differentiated visually. Once again, brightness is 
the only visual variable used to differentiate between symbols in different rows. Apart 
from the generalization relationship, the only way to differentiate between the other 
relations is through textual differentiation or by determining other syntax variables 
involved. For example, a directed association relationship can be differentiated from a 
threaten relationship without using text if it is connecting an actor and a use case. 
Similarly, a threaten relationship is only allowed to be directed from a misuse case to a 
use case. In general, relations in MUC modeling notation do not contain enough visual 
distance between them. 
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3.1.4. Dual Coding 
The use of textual annotation as the primary means to distinguish between two constructs 
is ill advised [6] according to the principle of Dual Coding. However, using text per se 
should not be forbidden. In fact, according to dual coding theory [16], using graphics and 
text together to convey information is more effective than using either on their own. 
Therefore, text should be used as a form of redundant coding to complement graphics. 
According to communication theory, redundant coding reduces errors and counteracts 
noise [17]. The extra information in verbal form provides better clarification of the 
meaning of constructs. As discussed in previous sections, the MUC modeling notation 
heavily relies on textual differentiation as the only means to determine different 
relationships. 
3.1.5. Graphic Economy 
The principle of Graphic Economy refers to having a suitable number of graphical 
symbols available for use in any notation. A large number of graphical symbols can lead 
to complex diagrams and a steep learning curve for novices. Research has introduced an 
upper limit of 6 categories for humans to discriminate between perceptually distinct 
alternatives [18]. The MUC modeling notation satisfies the upper limit as the number of 
graphical symbols used in the notation fall into 3 distinct categories: ovals, stickman 
figures and arrows. It will be advised to leverage the extra room to introduce perceptually 
distinct symbols that can resolve aforementioned issues, such cases of symbol overload 
and low levels of perceptual discriminability. 
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3.1.6. Semantic Transparency 
The principle of Semantic Transparency is concerned with the use of graphical symbols 
that imply the meaning of their corresponding constructs. For example, a stickman figure 
is widely understood to mean a person. The use of such symbols speeds up the 
interpretation of diagrams and reduces the learning curve for novices. In MUC modeling 
only the actor, misuser and attacker symbols, depicted as stickman figures, suggest the 
meaning of a person. However, it should be noted that actors, misusers and inside 
attackers might not be humans. In such cases the stickman figure may actually be more 
misleading than a neutral symbol such as the generic rectangle. The oval symbols used 
offer no suggestion of the interaction-based behavior they embody. Similarly, the various 
types of arrow symbols are not suggestive of the types of relationship they represent. 
3.1.7. Cognitive Integration 
The principle of Cognitive integration refers to the inclusion of mechanisms to support 
integration of information with other diagrams. Conceptual integration and perceptual 
integration are two categories of cognitive integration. Conceptual integration is 
concerned with providing mechanisms to help assemble information from multiple 
diagrams to form a more complete model mentally. Perceptual integration involves 
providing cues for easier navigation between multiple diagrams. Similar to UC models, 
MUC models do not contain any explicit mechanisms for conceptual or perceptual 
integration. This does not imply that techniques cannot be devised to facilitate cognitive 
integration. For example, a technique was introduced in [26] that can be used to 
transform MUC to mal-activity diagrams [27]. However, the technique enabled 
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navigation from MUC to mal-activity diagrams via a model transformation algorithm and 
not via navigational features in the MUC modeling notation [26]. 
3.1.8. Cognitive Fit  
The cognitive fit principle is concerned with having various suitable dialects for each 
targeted audience. Some dialects can be made complex and suitable for advanced users 
while other dialects can be simplified and made suitable for novices. A MUC model is a 
requirements engineering artifact. As is the case with any requirements engineering 
artifact, it should be readable and comprehensible by non-technical stakeholders who can 
provide critical early phase feedback. The MUC diagram notation does not contain 
multiple dialects. One of the most popular aspects of UC diagrams is its simplicity. The 
MUC diagram notation is not a major extension of the UC diagram notation. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the current MUC diagram notation is not expected to be very difficult 
to understand even by novices, as it is not a major extension to the UC diagrams notation. 
3.1.9. Manageable Complexity 
The principle of Complexity Management recommends that a notation should include 
mechanisms to manage complex diagrams. The mechanisms enable models to convey 
information without overloading the human mind. Modularization and hierarchical 
abstractions are two techniques that can be used to manage complexity [6]. 
Modularization is concerned with the division of a large complex system into smaller 
parts that are easier to comprehend. Hierarchical abstraction focuses on representing a 
large complex system with different levels, where levels have different degrees of detail. 
The MUC modeling notation contains no explicit mechanism for complexity 
management. 
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3.2. Misuse Case Maps 
This section contains the evaluation results of the MUCM notation according to PoN. The 
evaluation considers the original notational set introduced by Karpati, Sindre and Opdahl 
[1]. The evaluation is presented in the following nine subsections, each summarizing a 
principle before presenting the evaluation results of the MUCM modeling notation based 
on that principle. An outline of the subsequent subsections is presented in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 MUCM Evaluation Outline 
 
3.2.1. Semiotic Clarity 
The principle of semiotic clarity states that notations should be designed in such a way 
that the graphical symbols have a one-to-one mapping to the semantic constructs they 
represent. Failure to achieve such mapping can lead to one of more of the following 
anomaly: Symbol Redundancy, Symbol Overload, Symbol Deficit, and Symbol Excess. 
Evaluating a notation for the principle of semiotic clarity requires finding the presence of 
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the aforementioned anomalies by comparing the symbol set of the notation to its 
semantics.  
Symbol Redundancy - The MUCM modeling notation does not contain any instances of 
symbol redundancy. All the constructs available in the meta-model have at most one 
corresponding graphical symbol to represent them.  
Symbol Overload - The MUCM modeling notation does not contain any instances of 
symbol overload. All the symbols used in the notation are used to represent at most one 
construct.  
Symbol deficit and Symbol Excess - The MUCM modeling notation has no symbol 
deficit since all the semantic constructs can be represented by one graphical symbol. Note 
that symbol deficit is evaluated based on the semantics described by the respective 
authors of the notation [1]. Similarly, the MUCM modeling notation does not contain any 
instances of symbol excess as each graphical symbol corresponds to at least one semantic 
construct.  
3.2.2. Visual Expressiveness 
The principle of Visual Expressiveness suggests using as many of Bertin’s [15] visual 
variables to increase the expressiveness of notation as a whole, while limiting the use of 
text. The notation of MUCM modeling has visual expressiveness of level 4 as it uses a 
combination of four visual variables: location, color, shape and brightness.  
Location - MUCM uses the complete set of planar variables from Bertin’s visual 
variables; the position of component on the diagram is crucial to conveying accurate 
information.  
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Color - The MUCM notation uses two values of color for its graphical symbols. The 
color red is used when documenting exploits paths regardless of their affinity to cause 
damage, while the color black is used to signify normal scenario paths. 
Shape - The MUCM extension has introduced multiple new graphical symbols that are of 
different shapes (Table 3). The use of multiple new shapes has advantage of reducing the 
anomalies that can occur as specified in principle of semiotic clarity; however the use of 
excessive graphical symbols requires the reader to be better acquainted with the notation 
set, thus making the learning curve steeper. 
Brightness - The security-based extension of MUCM varies brightness to signify 
mitigation. The vulnerable component is unfilled in the case of no mitigation, while it is 
fill gray if the component vulnerability has been mitigated. 
Table 3 Shape categories of MUCM 
Shape Category Graphical Symbol 
Triangle 
 
Oval 
 
Oval with lighting bolt 
 
Rectangle 
 
Hourglass 
 
Hexagon 
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3.2.3. Perceptual Discriminability 
Perceptual Discriminability is concerned with the ease with which graphical symbols 
belong to the same notation can be differentiated from each other. It requires visual 
language designers to maximize their utilization of different visual variables to increase 
the visual distance [6] between symbols in order to visually stand out for easier 
recognition. Recall that the MUCM modeling notation introduces multiple new shapes to 
represent different constructs. This makes the MUCM modeling notation to have a high 
level of perceptual discriminability, with a disadvantage of making the notation more 
difficult (as will be discussed in section 3.2.5).  
3.2.4. Dual Coding 
The use of text as the primary means to distinguish between two constructs is ill advised 
[6] according to the principle of Dual Coding. Therefore, text should be used as a form of 
redundant coding to complement graphics. The extra information in verbal form provides 
better clarification of the meaning of constructs. The MUCM modeling notation correctly 
uses text in its diagram to provide details regarding scenarios, path, and components. The 
use of text in this capacity is encouraged as it provides diagram readers with more 
information. 
3.2.5. Graphic Economy 
The principle of Graphic Economy refers to having a suitable number of graphical 
symbols available for use in any notation. A large number of graphical symbols can lead 
to complex diagrams and a steep learning curve for novices. Research has introduced an 
upper limit of 6 categories for humans to discriminate between perceptually distinct 
alternatives [18]. The MUCM modeling notation easily breaks this upper limit even when 
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the only the security based additions are counted (Table 3). Since the MUCM notation 
incorporates the UCM modeling notation as well, which has graphic complexity of 28 
[12], the number of graphical symbols needed to be accustomed to goes way beyond the 
upper limit defined by [18]. Such large numbers of graphical symbols will cause 
cognitive overload during interpretation and may lead to misinterpreted diagrams.  
3.2.6. Semantic Transparency 
The principle of Semantic Transparency is concerned with the use of graphical symbols 
that imply the meaning of their corresponding constructs. Of the six symbols introduced 
in MUCM (Table 3), only two can be considered semantic transparent. The hourglass 
symbols used to denote a misuser waiting at a component can be considered to signify a 
countdown timer. The second symbol is the lighting symbol denoting damage caused by 
an exploit scenario. The symbol of the lightning bolt is widely considered to represent 
danger. All other graphical symbols used conventional shapes that have no semantic 
meaning on their own. 
3.2.7. Cognitive Integration 
The principle of Cognitive integration refers to the inclusion of mechanisms to support 
integration of information with other diagrams using either conceptual integration or 
perceptual integration. MUCM modeling notation does not contain any explicit 
mechanisms for conceptual or perceptual integration.  
3.2.8. Cognitive Fit 
The cognitive fit principle is concerned with having various suitable dialects for each 
targeted audience. Some dialects can be made complex and suitable for advanced users 
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while other dialects can be simplified and made suitable for novices. The MUCM 
notation does not contain any mechanism to simplify the resulting document. However, 
the intended target audiences of MUCM modeling diagrams are experts who are well 
professed in system architect design, thus removing the need of having different dialects 
for different level of users. 
3.2.9. Manageable Complexity  
The principle of Complexity Management recommends that a notation should include 
mechanisms to manage complex diagrams using either modularization or hierarchical 
abstractions. MUCM notation, like is counterpart UCM modeling notation, does not 
contain any mechanism to mange complexity. However, we believe the notation does 
contain a possibility to use hierarchical abstraction as a means to manage complexity. 
The top level will contain the full view of the system architect and the scenario paths, 
while the lower level can provide more detail in each component, thus reducing 
complexity and making it easier for user to interpret the diagram. 
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4. CHAPTER 4 
IMPROVING MISUSE CASES 
4.1. Suggestions for MUC 
The evaluation results presented in chapter 3 highlights a number of issues that makes the 
cognitive effectiveness of the MUC diagram notation suboptimal. In this section we 
provide suggestions to improve MUC. The improvements are suggested in line with the 
principles of designing cognitively effectiveness notations, which were used to evaluate 
the current notation. Note that our suggestions do not cover symbols from the UC 
modeling notation as it shares symbols with other UML diagrams. Therefore, suggesting 
changes to the use case modeling notation would require an analysis of the entire UML 
notational set, which is beyond the scope of this work. Our suggestions are as follows: 
4.1.1. Case Nodes 
One of the problems encountered with the original oval symbol used to represent the use 
case construct resulted in symbol overload as there are two other subtypes of use cases: 
mitigating and threatened use cases. It would ostensibly seem correct to introduce new 
shapes to represent the different types of use cases. However, given the strong influence 
of shape in cognition, care has to be taken before introducing new symbols as different 
shape categories are comprehended by humans to denote categorically different 
semantics [6]. As such, using new shapes to depict different types of use cases will imply 
that they are semantically very different from regular use cases, which is not the case. To 
differentiate between the types of use cases, we suggest using color. For threatened use 
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cases, we suggest adding a second border that is colored red (Figure 8c), as the color red 
denotes warning/danger according to findings from the Color Psychology field [28]. The 
advantage of using adding a second border becomes apparent when a use case is 
threatened and mitigates a misuse case. Similarly the background color for mitigates use 
case can be changed to green, and shield icon can be added (Figure 8b). The shield icon 
is commonly used in software applications due to its semantic resemblance to 
defensiveness and safety. A bones and skeleton icon can be added the current symbol for 
misuse cases to annotate the new misuse case symbol (Figure 8a). The bones and 
skeleton figure, commonly present in the “Jolly Roger” flag, is a commonly known sign 
of imminent attack and intent to harm. All the changes introduced to the case nodes in 
MUC notation do not contain any changes to the actual shape of case nodes, which 
remains the same as in UC modeling (Figure 8d). 
 
(a) Misuse case 
 
(b) Mitigating use case 
 
 
(c) Threatened use case 
 
 
(d) Regular use case 
 
Figure 8 Suggested Graphical Symbols for Case Nodes 
 
4.1.2. Relationships 
Relationships in the MUC modeling notation do not have significant visual distance 
between them, as they do not use many visual variables. This leads to low levels of 
perceptual discriminability amongst the various types of relationships. To make matters 
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worse, many relationships use identical graphical symbols leading to many cases of 
symbol overload. We suggest complementing relationships arrows with icons and using 
colors while keeping the textual stereotypes as a form of redundant encoding. We also 
suggest using different values of the size variable, meaning different arrows will have 
different thicknesses. Suggested improvements to the relationships notations are as 
follows (see Table 4): 
─ Threatens relation – A thicker red colored arrow, annotated with a skeleton and bones 
icon. Use of the skeleton and bones icon is to be in line the suggested improvement for 
the misuse case notation. A thicker line suggests importance while the color red is 
suggestive of the danger is represents. 
─ Mitigates relation – Thicker green arrow, annotated with a shield icon. Use of the 
shield icon is in order to be in line with the icon used to annotate mitigating use cases. 
A thicker line suggests importance similar to the threaten relationship. Use of the color 
green is in order to be in line with the suggested improvement for the mitigating use 
case notation. 
Table 4 Suggested Graphical Symbols for relationships 
Relationship Suggested Notation 
Mitigate 
 
Threaten 
 
Include 
 
Extend 
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In fact, mitigate and threaten relationships have a similar thickness level that is different 
from other relationships. This is due to the fact that they belong to security domain while 
highlighting the importance of specifying the security-related semantics. The complete 
set of improvements for MUC is present in Table 5. For each semantic construct, a brief 
justification for suggested notation is given along with the list of PoN principles that have 
been affected. 
Table 5 Principles affected during improving MUC 
Semantic Old Notation Suggested Notation Justification 
PoN Effected 
Principles 
Mitigates 
relation   
- Use shield symbol 
and green color to 
increase perceptual 
discriminability, 
keeping text as form 
of redundant coding 
- Visual 
expressiveness 
- Perceptual 
Discriminibitliy 
- Dual Coding 
- Semiotic Clarity 
Threatens 
relation   
- Use skeleton 
symbol 
and red color to 
increase perceptual 
discriminability, 
keeping text as form 
of redundant coding 
- Visual 
expressiveness 
- Perceptual 
Discriminibitliy 
- Dual Coding 
- Semiotic Clarity 
Threatened 
Use case   
- Use extra red 
border to reduce 
symbol overload 
- Visual 
expressiveness 
- Perceptual 
Discriminibitliy 
- Semiotic Clarity 
Mitigating 
Use case   
- Use shield symbol 
and green 
background color to 
reduce symbol 
overload 
- Visual 
expressiveness 
- Perceptual 
Discriminibitliy 
- Semiotic Clarity 
Threatened 
and 
Mitigating 
Use case 
  
- Use extra red 
border, shield 
symbol and green 
background color to 
reduce symbol 
overload 
- Visual 
expressiveness 
- Perceptual 
Discriminibitliy 
- Semiotic Clarity 
Misuse 
Case   
- Use skeletion 
symbol to increase 
visual distance 
- Perceptual 
discriminability 
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4.2. Empirical Evaluation 
This section presents a subject-based experiment that was undertaken to examine the 
performance of the proposed NN with respect to the ON in light of two dependent 
variables. The experiment was performed at King Fahd University of Petroleum and 
Minerals, while the subjects used were enrolled in Software Engineering undergraduate 
degree. The experiment is reported using the standard experimentation process presented 
by Wohlin et al. [29].  
To measure the performance and the effects of changes to MUC notation, two dependent 
variables were recorded. The dependent variables are shown in Table 6, along with their 
respective hypotheses. The first variable is the response time variable (T), for which the 
alternative hypothesis indicates that the time taken to interpret the diagrams developed 
using the NN will be less than the time required to interpret diagrams developed using 
ON. The second variable is the errors committed variable (E), for which the alternative 
hypothesis states that interpreting the diagrams developed using the NN will result in 
subjects committing fewer errors than interpreting diagrams developed in ON. 
Table 6 The dependent variables and their corresponding hypotheses 
Dependent Variable Null Hypothesis (Ho): Alternative Hypothesis (Ha): 
Response Times (Ho1): T (NN) ≥ T (ON) (Ha1): T (NN) < T (ON) 
Errors Committed (Ho2): E (NN) ≥ E (ON) (Ha2): E (NN) < E (ON) 
 
The test subjects used in the experiment Software Engineering undergraduate students 
enrolled in the second year of their degree. The experiment was conducted during the 
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second semester of 2014 academic year, i.e. Winter Session. The participating subjects 
had already taken an introductory Software Engineering course that covered UC 
modeling. Previous knowledge of UC modeling was an advantage for the study as the 
subjects were familiar with a notation set that is similar to the notation under analysis, 
thus reducing the overall learning curve. The subjects were given three lectures that 
covered the subjects of UC (refresh memory of students) and MUC in detail. In a 
subsequent session, the subjects performed exercises that further strengthen their 
knowledge of the MUC modeling.  
During the experiment, subjects were asked to interpret MUC diagrams of two systems, 
an RFID-based product authentication system [30] (Figure 14 and 15) and a Swiss 
portfolio management company system [31] (Figures 12 and 13). The diagrams are 
presented in Appendix A. To prevent bias, it is beneficial not to use diagrams that were 
created by the authors. The MUC diagrams from [31] and [30] were selected for this 
experiment as they represent real systems. Slight editions to the diagrams were performed 
for two purposes: (1) to ensure that the entire notational sets were used in each diagram, 
(2) to approximate their structural characteristics. The diagrams were also designed to 
have the same length and width. 
To perform the experiment, the subjects were divided evenly into two groups of 17 each 
(Group A and Group B). Two different diagrams were provided to the subjects where one 
of the diagrams was developed using the ON while the other diagram was developed 
using NN. For group A, the second diagram was developed using the NN, while group B 
had the first diagram developed using NN.  Research suggests that layout of a diagram 
affects the graph comprehension [32]. Therefore, both versions of each diagram (NN and 
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ON) were developed using an identical layout. A questionnaire (presented in Appendix 
B) was provided to the subjects that asked questions pertaining to the diagrams, such as 
“Identify all mitigating use cases”. The questionnaire contains two identical sets of 
questions, one for each diagram. Legends for both NN and the ON were also provided to 
the subjects. The subjects were asked measure the time taken to answer question 
pertaining to one diagram. 
To analyze the results of the experiment, two statistical tests were used: Mann-Whitney U 
statistic [33] and cliff’s delta [34][35][36]. Both of the tests are non-parametric, given the 
non-normal nature of the datasets. Mann-Whitney U is a non-parametric test that allows 
two hypotheses to be compared. The Mann-Whitney U was used to test the differences 
between the medians of related samples. The Hodges-Lehman method was used to 
calculate the confidence intervals around the difference between medians given at the 
standard p<0.05 level [37]. The second statistical test used is the Cliff’s delta, which is a 
non-parametric effect size measure. Cliff’s delta has been preferred over other statistical 
tests since empirical evidence suggests that it is superior when the data is non-parametric 
and possesses variance heterogeneity [38][39].  
 
4.3. Analysis and Interpretation 
In this section we investigate the effect of using the proposed MUC notation in 
comparison to the ON. This analysis explores the experimental results to provide some 
illustrative experiment-wide numerical analysis by considering the aggregated results 
from both MUC diagrams. The purpose of this analysis is to gain a more general 
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assessment of the overall impact of using the NN and to provide additional confidence to 
accept or reject the hypotheses relating to (T) and (E) variables. 
Figure 9 presents the cumulative performance of groups A and B with respect to the 
response time variable, while Figure 10 presents the cumulative performance with respect 
to the errors committed variable. Descriptive statistics about the two groups’ 
performances are shown in Table 7. The results of the Mann-Whitney test (Table 8) 
indicate a statistical significance for both variables. The result of Cliff’s delta calculations 
is presented in Table 9. The statistical significance for the response time variable is 
confirmed by a confidence interval range, which includes positive values only, as 
expected. However, the confidence interval range for the errors committed variable 
includes the number zero. This is in contract to the significance shown in the Mann-
Whitney U test. These calculations lead us to accept the hypothesis related to the (T) 
variable while rejecting the hypothesis related to the (E) variable, pending other 
revelations from subsequent analysis. 
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Figure 9 The cumulative performance of groups A and B with respect to response times for both misuse case diagrams  
 
Figure 10 The cumulative performance of groups A and B with respect to errors committed times for both misuse case 
diagrams 
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics for Group A + B (samples = 34) 
 
Table 8 Mann-Whitney test for Group A + B (samples = 34) 
 
Table 9 Cliff’s delta for Group A + B 
Variable 
Cliff’s 
delta ( ) 
Variance 
Confidence Interval around 
delta ( ) 
maximum minimum 
Response Times 0.798 0.008 0.914 0.562 
Errors 
Committed 
0.240 0.019 0.482 -0.035 
 
 
 
 
ˆ
ˆ
Variable Notation Min 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max IQR 
Response 
Times 
NN 450.0 530.8 647.0 736.6 1800.0 205.8 
ON 642.0 837.8 963.0 1192.1 2400.0 354.3 
Errors 
Committed 
NN 0.0 0.0 0.5 6.1 17.0 6.1 
ON 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.2 16.0 6.2 
Variable Technique 
Rank 
sum 
Mean 
rank 
U 
Difference 
between 
medians 
95% 
CI 
Mann-
Whitney 
U statistic 
p 
Response 
Times 
NN 712.00 20.94 1039.00 
328.00 
257.00 
to +∞ 
117.00 <0.0001 
ON 1634.00 48.06 117.00 
Errors 
Committed 
NN 1034.00 30.41 717.00 
1.00 
0.00 to 
+∞ 
439.00 0.0393 
ON 1312.00 38.59 439.00 
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4.4. Qualitative analysis  
In addition to the questions pertaining to the diagrams, the subjects were also provided a 
set of questions to elicit qualitative information after finishing questions pertaining to the 
diagrams. The three qualitative questions asked are as follows: 
1. Which notation did you prefer? 
2. What aspects of the notation you selected from (1) did you like? 
3. What aspects of the notation you selected from (1) did you not like or feel that 
they can be improved? 
Time used to answer qualitative questions was not recorded. These questions were added 
to help us get a better understanding of the preference of diagram users and the reasons 
for their choice. 
For the first question, all subjects who responded to the question preferred the NN with 
the exception of two subjects, one in each group. The subject in group A was indifferent 
to either of the notations, while the subject in group B preferred the ON. For the second 
question, all subjects who preferred the NN in question 1 were happy with the use of 
color, as it made reading the diagrams easy. The significant cause of this is that the use of 
color makes graphical symbols more prominent, therefore easier to spot. The subject in 
group A, who was indifferent did not answer the question, while the subject who 
preferred the ON in group B responded that the use of color was the reason for their 
choice on Question 1. For the last question, which asked for suggestion/comments, the 
majority of the subjects suggested to modify includes and extends relation to make them 
more prominent. However in this study, the extends and the includes relations were not 
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changed as these relations are part of widely used UC modeling notation, any changes to 
which would require in depth analysis of UML. 
 
4.5. Limitations  
The improvements proposed to MUC modeling in section 4.1 were effective at reducing 
the interpretation time, as evident during the empirical evaluation. The proposed changes 
to MUC depend on an increased use of color and graphical symbols. It can be said that 
the use of color will limit the usage scenarios of MUC modeling. The original MUC 
modeling notation is simple and the use of which requires little to no effort. The lack of 
color usage allows the diagrams to be constructed easily and quickly. However, in the 
proposed notation, the use of color is abundant and essential to the diagrams. This can 
limit the diagram creators, as additional tools are required some of which can lead to 
increased costs (color printing). However, it should be noted that the proposed notation 
introduces two changes to each semantic construct, color and graphical symbol. If the 
diagram developed using the NN is printed in grayscale (Figure 11), the graphical 
symbols introduces can be used to identify the semantic construct. The following 
identification technique can be used to identify the constructs:  
─ Threatened case – Two borders. 
─ Mitigating case – Case with shield symbol.  
─ Misuse case – Case with bone and skull symbol.  
─ Regular case – Case with no filling and one border. 
─ Mitigates relation – Solid arrow with shield symbol. 
─ Threatens relation – Solid arrow with bone and skull symbol. 
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With the aforementioned identification rules, it can be seen that the addition of symbols 
along with the use of color allows the diagrams developed using the NN to be interpreted 
even when color is not available. The limitation of using colors has been offset with the 
addition of symbols and given readers multiple ways to interpret the diagrams.  
 
46 
 
 
Figure 11 Proposed Notation Diagram in Grayscale 
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5. CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In this work, we have undertaken a systematic evaluation of the MUC and MUCM 
modeling notation. The evaluation is performed on the visual syntax of the notation using 
the principles defined in PoN. In MUC, several issues with the current notation have been 
determined, which include symbol overload, extensive use of textual encoding as a means 
to differentiate graphical symbols, low perceptual discriminability between symbols and 
low visual richness in the symbols used. MUCM also contains several issues that include 
a large number of graphical symbols used (making the notation complex), low semantic 
transparency and no mechanism for complexity management. These issues can cause the 
diagrams to be misinterpreted, leading to insecure systems that are effectively rendered 
useless.  
Following the evaluation, we have suggested improvements to MUC modeling notation 
to overcome the drawbacks highlighted. The modifications include the use of color, size 
and other graphical symbols. We have also changed the role of textual encoding in the 
new graphical symbols to complement the accompanying symbol and serve the purpose 
of redundant coding. The use of color to improve MUC is debatable for two reasons. 
First, color has a certain downside if the models in question are to be drawn by hand or 
printed. The lack of color utensils for drawing and printing will be in issue. Second, since 
MUC modeling is to be done alongside UC modeling, any attempt to significantly change 
MUC will affect the cohesion between the two modeling notations.  
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The improvements suggested in this paper were validated by user-studies. The user study 
is concerned with validating that the proposed notation can be read quicker and more 
accurately than the original notation. The user study was performed as an experiment that 
used software engineering students as subjects. There were two hypotheses set for the 
two variables of the experiment; response time and errors committed. The final 
hypotheses evaluation is shown in Table 10.  
Table 10 The dependent variables and their corresponding hypotheses 
Dependent 
Variable 
Null Hypothesis (Ho): Alternative Hypothesis (Ha): Results 
Response Times (Ho1): T (NN) ≥ T (ON) (Ha1): T (NN) <  T (ON) Accepted 
Errors Committed (Ho2): E (NN) ≥  E (ON) (Ha2): E (NN) <  E (ON) Rejected 
 
The main finding of the experiment is that the new notation can be read significantly 
quicker than the original notation. However, the results of the experiment did not allow 
us to accept the hypothesis that the new notation leads its reader to commit fewer reading 
errors. We believe that this phenomenon is due to the subjects spending more time 
reading the diagrams in order read it correctly. However, this conjuncture will require 
further empirical evidence. 
Qualitative data obtained from the subjects indicates that all subjects finished the 
experimental tasks without facing fatigue or maturation issues and without facing time 
pressure. Therefore, we believe that the results obtained in this experiment are solely 
influenced by the treatments. Qualitative data obtained has also shown that the subjects 
generally preferred the new MUC notation to the original notation. The subjects indicated 
that the main reason for their preference of the NN was the use of color-based 
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improvement. There were very few questions asked by the subjects during the experiment 
and in general there were no obvious problems observed during the experiment. 
Any future work based on this study can focus on two different areas. The first area 
involves continuing with MUCM and improving the notation by following the same path 
taken to improve the MUC in this work. The second area to focus is on the link between 
MUC and UML. This work largely ignores the link between UML and MUC; however 
better integration mechanisms are needed to link MUC diagrams with other diagrams in 
UML.  
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Appendix A – MUC Study Diagrams 
Table 11 Controlled experiment notation legend 
Construct Original Symbol Proposed Symbol 
User 
  
Misuser 
  
use case 
  
Threatened use case 
  
Mitigating use case 
  
Threatened and 
Mitigating use case   
Misuse case 
  
Includes relation 
  
Extends relation 
  
Threatens relation 
  
Mitigates relation 
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Figure 12 Banking Diagram (Old Notation) 
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Figure 13 Banking Diagram (New Notation) 
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Figure 14 RFID Diagram (Old Notation) 
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Figure 15 RFID Diagram (New Notation) 
  
59 
 
Appendix B – MUC Study Questionnaire 
Diagram 1 Questionnaire 
1. Identify all threatened use cases. 
  
   
 Attack against internal IT system   Location based authentication 
 Attack against RF communication   Prevent/detect tag removal 
 Authenticate product   Secure equipment environmental IT system 
 Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering   Secure internal IT system 
 Data theft from internal IT system   Secure tags against side channel attack 
 Detect cloned tags   Tag authentication 
 Forgery of product history   Tag cloning  
 Guarantee authenticity of history   Use security protocol with sufficient key length 
 Guarantee integrity of history   Verify object specific features 
 ID number copying    
 
2. Identify all mitigating use cases. 
  
   
 Attack against internal IT system   Location based authentication 
 Attack against RF communication   Prevent/detect tag removal 
 Authenticate product   Secure equipment environmental IT system 
 Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering   Secure internal IT system 
 Data theft from internal IT system   Secure tags against side channel attack 
 Detect cloned tags   Tag authentication 
 Forgery of product history   Tag cloning  
 Guarantee authenticity of history   Use security protocol with sufficient key length 
 Guarantee integrity of history   Verify object specific features 
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 ID number copying    
 
3. Identify all use cases that are threatened AND mitigating.  
  
   
 Attack against internal IT system   Location based authentication 
 Attack against RF communication   Prevent/detect tag removal 
 Authenticate product   Secure equipment environmental IT system 
 Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering   Secure internal IT system 
 Data theft from internal IT system   Secure tags against side channel attack 
 Detect cloned tags   Tag authentication 
 Forgery of product history   Tag cloning  
 Guarantee authenticity of history   Use security protocol with sufficient key length 
 Guarantee integrity of history   Verify object specific features 
 ID number copying    
 
4. Identify all use cases that are NOT threatened AND NOT mitigating. 
  
   
 Attack against internal IT system   Location based authentication 
 Attack against RF communication   Prevent/detect tag removal 
 Authenticate product   Secure equipment environmental IT system 
 Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering   Secure internal IT system 
 Data theft from internal IT system   Secure tags against side channel attack 
 Detect cloned tags   Tag authentication 
 Forgery of product history   Tag cloning  
 Guarantee authenticity of history   Use security protocol with sufficient key length 
 Guarantee integrity of history   Verify object specific features 
 ID number copying    
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5. Identify all misuse cases with mitigated relation. 
  
   
 Attack against internal IT system   Location based authentication 
 Attack against RF communication   Prevent/detect tag removal 
 Authenticate product   Secure equipment environmental IT system 
 Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering   Secure internal IT system 
 Data theft from internal IT system   Secure tags against side channel attack 
 Detect cloned tags   Tag authentication 
 Forgery of product history   Tag cloning  
 Guarantee authenticity of history   Use security protocol with sufficient key length 
 Guarantee integrity of history   Verify object specific features 
 ID number copying    
 
6. Identify all misuse cases with threatens relation. 
  
   
 Attack against internal IT system   Location based authentication 
 Attack against RF communication   Prevent/detect tag removal 
 Authenticate product   Secure equipment environmental IT system 
 Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering   Secure internal IT system 
 Data theft from internal IT system   Secure tags against side channel attack 
 Detect cloned tags   Tag authentication 
 Forgery of product history   Tag cloning  
 Guarantee authenticity of history   Use security protocol with sufficient key length 
 Guarantee integrity of history   Verify object specific features 
 ID number copying    
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7. Identify the following relations as E (Includes/Extends), T (Threatens), or M (Mitigates). 
 
   
 
Source 
 
Destination 
___ Attack against internal IT system Authenticate product 
___ Attack against RF communication Authenticate product 
___ Authenticate product  Tag authentication 
___ Authenticate product Verify object specific features 
___ Authenticate product  Prevent/detect tag removal 
___ Authenticate product  Secure equipment environmental IT system 
___ Authenticate product  Location based authentication 
___ Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering  Tag authentication 
___ Data theft from internal IT system  Tag authentication 
___ Detect cloned tags  Tag cloning 
___ Forgery of product history Detect cloned tags 
___ Guarantee authenticity of history  Forgery of product history 
___ ID number copying Authenticate product 
___ Location based authentication Guarantee integrity of history 
___ Location based authentication Guarantee authenticity of history 
___ Location based authentication Detect cloned tags 
___ Secure equipment environmental IT system Attack against internal IT system 
___ Secure equipment environmental IT system Attack against RF communication 
___ Secure internal IT system Data theft from internal IT system 
___ Tag authentication Use security protocol with sufficient key length 
___ Tag authentication  Secure tags against side channel attack 
___ Tag authentication  Secure internal IT system 
___ Tag authentication  ID number copying 
___ Tag cloning Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering 
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___ Tag cloning Attack against internal IT system 
___ Tag cloning Attack against RF communication 
___ Tag cloning  Forgery of product history 
___ Tag cloning Data theft from internal IT system 
___ Tag cloning  ID number copying 
___ Use security protocol with sufficient key length Cryptanalysis and reverse engineering 
___ Verify object specific features  Tag cloning 
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Diagram 2 Questionnaire 
1. Identify all threatened use cases. 
  
   
Alert authorities in case of suspicion  Maintain business 
Comply with country regulation  Monitor transaction amounts 
Enroll new clients   Probe bank operations 
Establish good reputation   Provide ROI to clients 
 Invest anonymously   Reject suspicious clients 
 Invest illegal funds   Reject transfer amount above threshold 
 Invest one large sum   Take client orders 
 Invest under false identity   Verify client identity 
Launder money   Verify origin of funds 
 
2. Identify all mitigating use cases. 
  
   
Alert authorities in case of suspicion  Maintain business 
Comply with country regulation  Monitor transaction amounts 
Enroll new clients   Probe bank operations 
Establish good reputation   Provide ROI to clients 
 Invest anonymously   Reject suspicious clients 
 Invest illegal funds   Reject transfer amount above threshold 
 Invest one large sum   Take client orders 
 Invest under false identity   Verify client identity 
Launder money   Verify origin of funds 



    
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
3. Identify all use cases that are threatened AND mitigating.  
  
   
Alert authorities in case of suspicion  Maintain business 
Comply with country regulation  Monitor transaction amounts 
Enroll new clients   Probe bank operations 
Establish good reputation   Provide ROI to clients 
 Invest anonymously   Reject suspicious clients 
 Invest illegal funds   Reject transfer amount above threshold 
 Invest one large sum   Take client orders 
 Invest under false identity   Verify client identity 
Launder money   Verify origin of funds 
 
 
 
4. Identify all use cases that are NOT threatened AND NOT mitigating.  
  
   
Alert authorities in case of suspicion  Maintain business 
Comply with country regulation  Monitor transaction amounts 
Enroll new clients   Probe bank operations 
Establish good reputation   Provide ROI to clients 
 Invest anonymously   Reject suspicious clients 
 Invest illegal funds   Reject transfer amount above threshold 
 Invest one large sum   Take client orders 
 Invest under false identity   Verify client identity 
Launder money   Verify origin of funds 
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5. Identify all misuse cases with mitigated relation. 
  
   
Alert authorities in case of suspicion  Maintain business 
Comply with country regulation  Monitor transaction amounts 
Enroll new clients   Probe bank operations 
Establish good reputation   Provide ROI to clients 
 Invest anonymously   Reject suspicious clients 
 Invest illegal funds   Reject transfer amount above threshold 
 Invest one large sum   Take client orders 
 Invest under false identity   Verify client identity 
Launder money   Verify origin of funds 
 
 
6. Identify all misuse cases with threatens relation. 
  
   
Alert authorities in case of suspicion  Maintain business 
Comply with country regulation  Monitor transaction amounts 
Enroll new clients   Probe bank operations 
Establish good reputation   Provide ROI to clients 
 Invest anonymously   Reject suspicious clients 
 Invest illegal funds   Reject transfer amount above threshold 
 Invest one large sum   Take client orders 
 Invest under false identity   Verify client identity 
Launder money   Verify origin of funds 
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7. Identify the following relations as E (Includes/Extends), T (Threatens), or M 
(Mitigates). 
    
 
Source 
 
Destination 
___ Alert authorities in case of suspicion Launder money 
___ Comply with country regulation  Probe bank operations 
___ Comply with country regulation Launder money 
___ Comply with country regulation Verify client identity 
___ Enroll new clients Verify client identity 
___ Enroll new clients Reject suspicious clients 
___ Establish good reputation Comply with country regulation 
___ Establish good reputation  Provide ROI to clients 
___ Invest anonymously Take client orders 
___ Invest one large sum Monitor transaction amounts 
___ Invest under false identity Take client orders 
___ Launder money Establish good reputation 
___ Launder money  Invest anonymously 
___ Launder money  Invest under false identity 
___ Launder money  Invest illegal funds 
___ Launder money  Invest one large sum 
___ Maintain business Establish good reputation 
___ Maintain business Enroll new clients 
___ Maintain business  Provide ROI to clients 
___ Monitor transaction amounts Reject transfer amount above threshold 
___ Probe bank operations Establish good reputation 
___ Provide ROI to clients Take client orders 
___ Reject suspicious clients  Probe bank operations 
___ Reject suspicious clients Reject transfer amount above threshold 
___ Reject suspicious clients Alert authorities in case of suspicion 
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___ Reject transfer amount above threshold  Invest one large sum 
___ Reject transfer amount above threshold Alert authorities in case of suspicion 
___ Take client orders Verify origin of funds 
___ Take client orders Monitor transaction amounts 
___ Verify client identity  Invest anonymously 
___ Verify client identity  Invest under false identity 
___ Verify origin of funds  Invest illegal funds 
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Questions 
 
Q1- Which notation did you like the most (New Notation or Old Notation)? 
 
 
 
 
Q2- Why did you like the notation you chose? What was your experience when 
performing the exercises? 
 
 
 
 
Q3- How do you think the notation you chose can be improved? 
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Appendix C – MUC Study Raw Results 
Table 12 Response times for Group A and Group B 
Group A Time (Seconds) Group B Time (Seconds) 
Subject Diagram 1 (ON) Diagram 2 (NN) Subject Diagram 1 (NN) Diagram 2 (ON) 
A1 1189 644 B1 571 825 
A2 867 500 B2 727 1282 
A3 1397 683 B3 1387 1452 
A4 954 450 B4 1001 1119 
A5 857 540 B5 945 1334 
A6 1590 743 B6 753 972 
A7 1048 531 B7 472 839 
A8 905 584 B8 528 780 
A9 763 482 B9 663 785 
A10 870 485 B10 724 843 
A11 1226 500 B11 736 867 
A12 780 630 B12 650 734 
A13 1023 556 B13 778 1145 
A14 1444 728 B14 555 777 
A15 642 482 B15 686 1040 
A16 1130 550 B16 720 1020 
A17 934 759 B17 1800 2400 
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Table 13 Errors committed for Group A 
Group A Errors 
Diagram 1 Diagram 2 
Subject 
Wrong 
Identification 
Overlooked  Total 
Wrong 
Identification 
Overlooked  Total 
A1 3 3 6 0 0 0 
A2 2 0 2 0 1 1 
A3 11 0 11 4 5 9 
A4 0 0 0 6 0 6 
A5 0 1 1 0 0 0 
A6 1 2 3 1 0 1 
A7 2 1 3 1 0 1 
A8 14 1 15 0 0 0 
A9 0 13 13 10 0 10 
A10 0 2 2 0 9 9 
A11 0 1 1 0 0 0 
A12 0 2 2 0 0 0 
A13 6 10 16 1 1 2 
A14 11 1 12 0 0 0 
A15 1 4 5 17 0 17 
A16 0 0 0 5 8 13 
A17 1 1 2 0 0 0 
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Table 14 Errors committed for Group B 
Group B Errors 
Diagram 1 Diagram 2 
Subject 
Wrong 
Identification 
Overlooked Total 
Wrong 
Identification 
Overlooked Total 
B1 0 0 0 0 3 3 
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B3 1 0 1 0 0 0 
B4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
B5 7 0 7 5 3 8 
B6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B7 0 0 0 3 6 9 
B8 13 0 13 6 7 13 
B9 0 0 0 1 2 3 
B10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B11 0 0 0 1 1 2 
B12 0 0 0 0 1 1 
B13 4 0 4 0 0 0 
B14 0 0 0 1 1 2 
B15 8 0 8 0 0 0 
B16 1 0 1 0 4 4 
B17 0 1 1 0 1 1 
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Appendix D – MUC Study Raw Qualitative Data 
1- Which notation did you like the most (ON or NN)? 
2- Why did you like the about the notation you chose? What was your experience when 
performing the exercises? 
3- How do you think the notation you chose can be improved? 
Table 15 Qualitative results for Group A 
Group A Qualitative Results  
Subject Q1 Q2 Q3 
A1 NN 
Filling the diagram with color makes it 
clearer and quicker at identifying the kind 
of use case 
Satisfied and add nothing 
A2 NN it is easier to get  No Answer 
A3 Neither  No Answer 
Add symbols/colors for include and 
extends. 
A4 
No 
Answer 
No Answer  No Answer  
A5 NN 
Sight goes to it directly. The original 
diagram we can’t see what's wanted 
properly, while the proposed is much 
clearer. 
Increase size of red border for 
threatened use case 
A6 NN Easier and faster to read.  NN 
A7 NN 
Easier to deal with. Easier to detect and 
infer information is quicker. 
Maybe put the first letter of the 
relationship at the start of arrow in 
use case. (See provided drawing) 
A8 NN 
Because it is easier to recognize and less 
error. 
Differentiate between extends and 
includes 
A9 NN Easier to look at and get information from. 
No need for icons, only color will 
do. 
A10 NN Colorful, felt like no need to double check. Use icons. 
A11 NN 
Easy to understand, easy to follow relation 
arrows and attractive. 
No idea 
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A12 NN Simple and easy to understand. 
Maybe having symbols for includes 
and extends. 
A13 NN Easier to catch (Find), simple The icon used can be more simpler 
A14 NN 
it grasps the attention and you can know the 
relation just by looking and it saves time 
adding color for extend and includes 
relations 
A15 NN easier to understand and follow I think it is perfect 
A16 NN 
You can tell the kind of use case without 
tracing, more comfortable. 
make different colors for extend and 
includes 
A17 NN 
It is easier, the original notation is 
confusing as you have to identify the 
relation in order to id the use case, while in 
the proposed we can tell just by looking at 
the use case 
Differentiate between the 
threatening and mitigated misuse 
cases, just like the use cases. 
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Table 16 Qualitative results for Group B 
Group B Qualitative Results  
Subject Q1 Q2 Q3 
B1 NN 
Easy to notice and gives better 
understanding with less amount 
of thinking. Don’t have to 
concentrate as much. 
Improve the includes/extends relations. 
Bold for includes. 
B2 NN 
Faster to grasp, less boring and 
more fun. 
No Answer 
B3 NN Easy to understand. perfect 
B4 No Answer No Answer No Answer 
B5 NN 
speedy and easy to understand 
and find 
Differentiate between include/extends 
and color the normal use case orange. 
B6 NN 
Colorful and easy to track use 
cases and their relations. 
differentiate between include/extends 
B7 NN Easier and less time consuming. 
 Color printing is costly.  
 Using smaller icons near use case 
will be useful.  
 Have different style of lines 
connecting use cases. 
B8 NN 
Colored diagram was easy while 
the black and white caused a 
headache. 
The lines connections could be dotted or 
thick. 
B9 NN 
It is more cleaner, you can 
immediately see all the relations 
and understand diagram quickly. 
It is much more fun to read and 
extract information from. 
There will be always room before 
improvements, but the idea is great. 
Hope this will be use case standard. 
B10 NN 
It is clear, I felt comfortable when 
reading the one with proposed 
notation and confident about my 
answers. 
Nothing. 
B11 ON 
In the original, I just check the 
use case and the relation between 
them. The proposed notation, I 
check the use case and also I 
check its shape and I need to 
remember the shapes. 
minimize the number of shapes 
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B12 NN 
It is easier to grasp and 
understand. 
if there was a way to arrange the use 
cases and the actors and relations links 
B13 NN It is simple. No Answer 
B14 NN It is easier to read and understand. No Answer 
B15 No Answer No Answer No Answer 
B16 NN 
Very easy to follow and 
comprehend 
No Answer 
B17 No Answer No Answer No Answer 
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